Jacobsen v. Katzer Case
The case issue
Jacobsen v. Katzer case refers to a lawsuit that took place between Robert Jacobsen and Matthew Katzer, the plaintiff and defendant respectively. The case issue entails whether the terms of the artistic license conditions of the copyright license appropriate and did the court do wrong by turning down Jacobsen’s motion for a preliminary injunction. It was filed on March 13, 2006. Major issues that were addressed in the claim were copyright, digital millennium copyright act, patent invalidity and cybersquatting. The plaintiff was holding a copyright to a programming code particularly the Java Model Railroad Interface (JMRI). He then made the code available for the public to download in the absence of a financial fee pursuant to the open source artistic license. The defendants developed a commercial software from the code leading the plaintiff to accuse them of copying segments of the code (United States District Court, Northern District of California).
The court holding
During the ruling, the northern district judge held that liability for an open source copyright violation. However, the judge did not agree with Jacobsen’s claim for damages (United States District Court, Northern District of California).
The court’s reason for its holding
The court ruling held that the plaintiff’s claim were pointless because it was not possible for Jacobsen to recover the money damages. According to the district court, the open source license established an intentionally wide nonexclusive license whose scope was unlimited. As a result, it did not establish a liability for copyright infringement. However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals following plaintiff’s appeal ruled in favor of Jacobsen asserting that the open source copyright claim was enforceable and thus awarded damages (United States District Court, Northern District of California).
State whether you agree with the holding explain why or why not
The district court was wrong in ruling against the plaintiff and his motion for a preliminary injunction. However, the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals was right in ruling in favor of the plaintiff and awarding damages. The fact that the open source license gave conditions through the use of the phrase “provided that.’ the district court had misinterpreted the license as one that allows the users to change the material in any manner they place and ignored the conditions provided in the license thus denied the plaintiff’s grant. It is apparent that the district court failed to credit the obvious limitations that administered a user’s right to change and disseminate the copyrighted work. Even though the lice was an open source one, it had conditions on how to acquire the product if one wished to modify it and use for their own operations. Therefore, it was improper for the defendant to change and distribute the material without receiving consent from the developer.
Works Cited
United States District Court, Northern District of California. Robert Jacobsen v. Matthew Katzer and Kamind Associates, Inc. 535 F.3d 1373. Fed. Cir. 2008.
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ROBERT JACOBSEN, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW KATZER and KAMIND ASSOCIATES, INC., Defendants.
No. C 06-01905 JSW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115204; 93 U.S.P.Q.2D (BNA) 1236
December 10, 2009, Decided
December 10, 2009, Filed
JUDGES: JEFFREY S. WHITE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
OPINION BY: JEFFREY S. WHITE
OPINION
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF’S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Now before the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Robert Jacobsen and the [*2] motion for partial summary judgment filed by Defendants Matthew Katzer and Kamind Associates, Inc. Having considered the parties’ pleadings, the relevant legal authority, and having had the benefit of oral argument, the Court hereby GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment and DENIES Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment.
BACKGROUND
Matthew Katzer is the chief executive officer and chairman of the board of directors of Kamind Associates, Inc., a software company based in Portland, Oregon that develops software for model railroad enthusiasts. The Java Model Railroad Interface (“JMRI”) Project is an on-line, open source community that also develops model train software. Plaintiff, Robert Jacobsen, works for the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and is a professor of physics at the university, as well as a model train hobbyist and a leading member of the JMRI Project.
Defendants move for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claim for copyright infringement and his claim for violation of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act and on all associated relief sought for these claims. Defendants do not challenge the cybersquatting claim.
Plaintiff [*3] also moves for summary judgment on his copyright infringement and cybersquatting claims, as well as moving for judgment on three affirmative defenses to Defendants’ counterclaim for copyright infringement.
The Court will address additional specific facts as required in the analysis.
ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standards Applicable to Motions for Summary Judgment.
Summary judgment is proper when the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits show that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings, discovery, and affidavits that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Once the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and, by its own affidavits or discovery, “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). On an issue for which the opposing party will have the burden of proof at trial, the moving party need only point out “that there is an [*4] absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. Inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 501 U.S. 496, 520, 111 S. Ct. 2419, 115 L. Ed. 2d 447 (1991).
Actions arising under the Copyright Act must adhere to the same summary judgment standard as any other civil action. Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1358-59 (9th Cir. 1990). Accordingly, copyright claims can be resolved on summary judgment where there is no dispute of material fact. Brown Bag Software v. Symantec Corp., 960 F.2d 1465, 1472 (9th Cir. 1929). In particular, “[c]opyrightability is often resolved on summary judgment … because very often no issues of material fact are in dispute and the only task for the court is to analyze the allegedly copyrightable item in light of applicable copyright law.” Sem-Torq, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 936 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted).
B. Copyright Originality.
The Constitution gives Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science … by securing for limited Times to Authors … the exclusive Right to their … Writings.” U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Accordingly, Congress has granted copyright protection [*5] to “original works of authorship,” 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), as well as to “compilations.” 17 U.S.C. § 103(a). The copyright compilation “extends only to the material contributed by the author of such work, as distinguished from the preexisting material employed in the work….” 17 U.S.C. § 103(b).
Discoverable facts, like ideas, are not copyrightable. CDN Inc. v. Kapes, 197 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1999). But compilations of facts are copyrightable even when the underlying facts are not. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 344, 111 S. Ct. 1282, 113 L. Ed. 2d 358 (1991). “Subject matter created by and original to the author merits copyright protection. Items not original to the author, i.e., not the product of his creativity, are facts and not copyrightable.” CDN, 197 F.3d at 1259. In order to warrant protection, compilations must contain a minimal amount of originality or creativity. Feist, 499 U.S. at 361. The requirement of originality, a prerequisite to any valid copyright, is “not particularly rigorous. Simply stated, original means not copied, and exhibiting a minimal amount of creativity.” Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d 509, 512-13 (2d Cir. 1991) [*6] (citing 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright, § 2.01 (1991)). The “requisite level of creativity is extremely low; even a slight amount will suffice. The vast majority of works make the grade quite easily, as they possess some creative spark, ‘no matter how crude, humble or obvious’ is might be.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 345 (quoting 1 M. Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright § 1.08[C][1] (1990)).
For compilations, “the originality requirement is not particularly stringent. A compiler may settle upon a selection or arrangement that others have used; novelty is not required. Originality requires only that the author make the selection or arrangement independently (i.e., without copying that selection or arrangement from another work), and that it display some minimal level of creativity. Presumably, the vast majority of compilations will pass this test, but not all will. There remains a narrow category of works in which the creative spark is utterly lacking or so trivial as to be nonexistent.” Id. at 358-59.
In Feist, the Court found that the white page listings of telephone numbers in alphabetical order did not qualify for copyright protection as a compilation because it was found [*7] to be completely devoid of originality. Id. at 361. In Key Publications, however, the court found sufficient creativity to warrant copyright protection because the author of the yellow pages had excluded from the directory those businesses she did not think would remain open for very long. 945 F.2d at 513. Factual compilations which manifest choices as to selection and arrangement, made independently by the compiler and entailing a minimal degree of creativity, are “sufficiently original that Congress may protect such compilations through the copyright laws.” Feist, 499 U.S. at 1289 (citations omitted). “Thus, even a directory that contains absolutely no protectible written expression, only facts, meets the constitutional minimum for copyright protection if it features an original selection or arrangement.” See id. (citing Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 547, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 85 L. Ed. 2d 588 (1985)).
The court in CDN found that the author’s estimates for the fair value of coins, which were then compiled into a price list, were sufficiently creative to warrant copyright protection. 197 F.3d at 1260. In CCC Information Services, Inc. v. Maclean Hunter Market Reports, the Second Circuit [*8] found that the compilation of editors’ projections for the value of different kinds of used cars were not preexisting facts, but rather represented predictions by the editors of future prices, based on a multitude of data sources as well as professional judgment and expertise. 44 F.3d 61, 67 (2d Cir. 1994). Just as in CDN, because the compilation of data included the judgment and expertise of the authors in estimating value, the court found the requisite modicum of creativity sufficient to award the compilation copyright protection.
In sum, copyright protections may be afforded compilations if there is a minimum level of creativity, either in the production of the data compiled or in the selection and arrangement of available, and otherwise noncopyrightable, data.
